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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
V. : 
MELANIE E. POMIKALA, : Case No. 981249-CA 
Priority No. 2 
De f endant/Appe11ant. : 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE BANK IS NOT A "NATURAL PERSON" UNDER THE PLAIN 
MEANING OF THE RESTITUTION STATUTE AND THE COURT 
THEREFORE ERRED IN ORDERING POMIKALA TO PAY RESTITUTION. 
The State asserts that the term "natural person" should be 
construed to include First Security Bank ("Bank") and, on this 
basis, contends that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in ordering Appellant Melanie Pomikala ("Pomikala") to pay the Bank 
restitution. See State's Brief ("S.B.") at 6-11. The State bases 
its analysis on the principles of statutory construction that ""a 
statute should be given a reasonable and sensible construction and 
that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable 
result.1" S.B.8 (quoting State v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 313 
(Utah 1988)). From this, the State contends that excluding the 
Bank from the class of restitution-eligible victims would lead to 
an absurd result unintended by the legislature. Id. at 9. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, however, the Bank is not 
restitution-eligible under Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-201 (Supp. 
1997), Utah's restitution statute. As an initial matter, the 
State's analysis does not address the primary principle of 
statutory construction, which is that a statute must first be 
construed in light of its plain language, the principal indicator 
of legislative intent. See Perrine v. Kennecott Min. Corp., 911 
P.2d 1290, 1291 (Utah 1996). As explained by the Utah Supreme 
Court: 
We are not to infer substantive terms into the text [of 
a statute] that are not already there. Rather, the 
interpretation must be based on the language used, and 
the court has no power to rewrite the statute to conform 
to an intention not expressed. 
Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994) . 
Accordingly, 
[f]aced with a question of statutory construction, we 
examine the plain language of the statute. See Stephens 
v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 
1997). We do not look beyond the plain language unless 
we find ambiguity. See id. . . . . Because we assume 
that the legislature used each term in the statute 
advisedly, we read the statute's words literally "unless 
such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable." 
Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 811 P.2d 
664, 670 (Utah 1991). 
Olsen v. Samuel Mclntvre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 1998); 
see also Appellant's Brief ("A.B.") at 7 (discussing statutory 
construction). A court may look beyond the plain language of a 
statute only when a construction under its plain language is 
"unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of 
the express purpose of the statute." Perrine, 911 P.2d at 1291. 
Under this order of statutory construction, therefore, the 
State's analysis overlooking the plain language of Utah's 
restitution statute is misplaced and contravenes clear legislative 
intent. As an initial matter, and as discussed in Pomikala's 
opening brief, Appellant's Brief ("A.B.") at Point A, the 
restitution statute in effect at the time of Pomikala's restitution 
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hearing (March 6, 1998 - hearing; March 18, 1998 - written court 
order for restitution) provided in plain and unambiguous language 
that restitution-eligible victims must be "natural person[s]". 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1997) (allowing 
restitution to "victims of crime" as defined in the Rights of Crime 
Victims Act); Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2 (9) (a) (Supp. 1997) (Rights 
of Crime Victims Act) (defining "victim" as "any natural person"). 
The phrase "natural person" by definition does not contemplate a 
non-human, corporate entity. A.B.6-7. Black's Law Dictionary 
similarly equates a "natural person" with a "human being." See 
Black's Law Dictionary 1142 (6th ed. 1990). Even Utah case law 
holds that the term "natural person" does not refer to banks, which 
are corporate entities, as opposed to human beings. See, e.g., 
Cade v. Zions First Nat' 1 Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, 1078 (Utah App. 
1998) (declining to include bank in definition of "natural person" 
set forth in National Association of Securities Dealers arbitration 
code); see also Tracey-Burke Associates v. Department of Employment 
Security, 699 P.2d 687, 688 (Utah 1985) (discussing distinction 
between "natural person" and "corporation," the latter being an 
"artificial entity created by law"). 
The clarity of the language enacted by the legislature, and 
hence its intent that "natural person" should include only human 
beings, is underscored given that the legislature implemented the 
qualifying term "natural" before "person." Under the general 
definition section of the Utah Code, the legislature deemed that a 
""[p]erson! means an individual, public or private corporation, 
3 
government, partnership, or unincorporated association." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-601 (Supp. 1998). By contrast, the legislature enacted 
the restitution statute with a much narrower definition of "person" 
in mind to the extent that it adopted the definition used in the 
Crime Victims Act, which narrowly conceives of "victim" as a 
"natural person." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (a) (I) ; § 77-38-
2(9) (a) . 
If the legislature intended the use of the wider definition of 
person that the State promotes on appeal with regard to restitution 
awards, it would have either provided a definition similar to that 
set forth in the general definition section of the Utah Code (§76-
1-601) or made reference to section 76-1-601 in the restitution 
statute itself. The legislature's choice to not do so is 
indicative of its intent to include the narrower definition of 
"natural person" as a human, non-corporate entity. See Stephens v. 
Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997) (where 
statutory language is clear and unambiguous, courts must "assume 
that each term . . . was used advisedly"). Moreover, "[i]t is a 
well-established rule of statutory construction that if two 
provisions address the same subject and one provision is general 
while the other is specific, the specific provision controls." 
State v. Westerman, 954 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah App. 1997) (citations 
omitted). Where the trial court ignored clearly expressed 
legislative intent by not following the plain, narrow meaning of 
"natural person, it erred as a matter of law in ordering Pomikala 
to pay restitution to the Bank, a non-human, corporate entity. See 
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id. at 696 (reviewing trial court's restitution order for 
correctness when "premised on statutory interpretation"). 
Given the plain and unambiguous language enacted by the 
legislature defining restitution-eligible victims as "natural 
persons," the trial court's restitution order, as well as the 
State's argument on appeal, is in error. Moreover, neither can be 
justified on the theory that following the plain language of the 
statute would lead to a result that is "unreasonably confused, 
inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of 
the statute." Perrine, 911 P. 2d at 1291. As noted above, the 
State argues that an absurd result would be reached should this 
Court follow the plain language of the restitution statute and 
exclude the Bank as a restitution-eligible victim. To illustrate 
its point, the State claims that under a literal interpretation, a 
person who owns a business as an incorporated entity and who is 
robbed is not eligible for restitution. Id. 
The State's claim that this Court should ignore the plain 
language of the statute in order to avoid an allegedly "absurd" 
result disregards the fact that it was the legislature's 
prerogative to define restitution-eligible victims as "natural 
persons". By the same token, it was the legislature's prerogative 
to amend the restitution statute after Pomikala's hearing to do 
away with the "natural person" language that is dispositive here. 
See A.B. 2 n.l, Point C. As noted by this Court in State v. 
Westerman, 945 P.2d 695, 699 n.5 (Utah App. 1997), and State v. 
Stirba. 1998 WL 893234 *4 n.4, with regard to the same restitution 
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statute at issue here, it is the legislature's role, and not that 
of the courts, to "enact remedial legislation" if application of 
the statute pursuant to its plain terms does not render the 
intended result. Simply because the result does not conform to 
what the State would like does not mean it is "absurd."1 
In addition, the "absurd" result complained of by the State is 
not the sort that demands reaching beyond the plain language of the 
restitution statute. In other cases wherein the Utah Supreme Court 
has looked beyond the plain language or, in the alternative, 
rejected a proposed statutory interpretation that did the same, the 
"absurd" result that the Court sought to avoid was qualitatively 
different. For example, in Perrine, the Court interpreted the 
Landowner Liability Act which was intended by the legislature to 
"free owners [of public and private land, who opened their land to 
the public for recreational purposes,] of liability for most 
injuries occurring on their land." 911 P.2d at 1292. Bearing the 
purpose of the statute in mind, namely to open land up to the 
public for recreational use, the Court rejected an interpretation 
of the term "public" that encompassed only a ""particular group.1" 
Id. at 1293. Instead, the Court found "public" to mean ""open to 
1
 In fact, the legislature's decision to not include 
corporate entities among the class of restitution-eligible 
victims is reasonable to the extent that corporations, which 
generally have more money and resources at their disposal, could 
easily pursue a civil remedy against defendants. By contrast, 
private persons do not have the same sort of ease of access to 
legal recourse in the event that they lose money on account of 
another's illegal behavior. Hence, it makes legislative sense to 
provide a statutory remedy for "natural persons" as opposed to 
corporate entities. 
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all1 " for purposes of the benefit of immunity conferred by the Act. 
Id. In so doing, the Court stated that it gave "effect to the 
Legislature's underlying intent." Id. at 1292. 
Likewise, in Division of Consumer Protection v. GAF Corp., 760 
P.2d 310 (Utah 1988), the Court rejected the trial court's reading 
of a provision of the Consumer Sales Practices Act ("CSPA"), Utah 
Code Ann. § 13-11-7 & § 13-11-17 (Supp. 1983), because it 
"essentially eviscerate[d] the Act and defeat[ed] the evident 
legislative objective of providing an effective remedy to consumers 
who have purchased defective products and who often have no 
practical private remedy." Id. at 312. Specifically, the court 
ruled that the trial court's construction of a certain provision of 
the CSPA would prevent consumers from recovering thereunder if they 
filed an independent claim prior to filing of a complaint with the 
Division of Consumer Protection, the enforcing agency of the CSPA. 
Id. The Court reasoned that this reading of the CSPA was 
unreasonable in light of the statute's specific direction that 
" the enforcing authority shall . . . receive and act on 
complaints'" at the "behest of consumers." Id. (quoting Utah Code 
Ann. § 13-11-7(d)). 
In light of the foregoing, the practical result of a literal 
interpretation of "natural person" is not so "absurd or 
unreasonable," id. at 313, that reaching beyond the plain language 
would be appropriate. Unlike the rejected interpretations in 
Perrine and GAF Corp., construing "natural person" to mean only 
human beings does not wholly eviscerate the purpose of the 
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restitution statute. In fact, contrary to the State's assertion, 
it provides a "sensible construction," id. , even though it does not 
conform to the outcome that the State would like to see on appeal. 
Accordingly, the State's argument on appeal that this Court should 
reach beyond the plain and reasonable language of the statute is 
unwarranted. 
II. THE BANK IS NOT A DIRECT VICTIM OF POMIKALA'S 
ACTIONS AND THEREFORE NOT RESTITUTION ELIGIBLE UNDER 
STATE V. WESTERMAN. 
The State likewise asserts on appeal that the trial court did 
not err in ordering Pomikala to pay restitution because the Bank is 
a direct victim of Pomikala's fraudulent ATM use. S.B.10. The 
State ignores the fact that the Bank bears only a contractual 
relationship with the " immediately and directly aggrieved' " victim 
in this case, Pomikala's grandmother. Westerman, 945 P.2d at 698; 
see A.B. Point B (discussing why the Bank is not a "direct" victim 
for purposes of restitution and this Court's Westerman opinion). 
By the same token, the State's reliance on State v. Stirba, 
1998 WL 893234 (Utah App. 1998) , is misplaced. In Stirba, this 
Court stated in dicta that Judge Stirba misconstrued the 
restitution statute when she ordered that ""a defendant cannot be 
required to pay restitution . . . to a victim who has already been 
reimbursed by the victim's insurance carrier.'" Id. at *4 (quoting 
Stirba's restitution order). Relying on Westerman, the Court 
reasoned that Stirba's order was incorrect in that the restitution 
she denied the victims was to be paid to the victims directly, as 
opposed to the victims' insurance carrier. Id. at *4 n.4. 
8 
"Westerman has no application absent an order specifically 
requiring that the defendant pay restitution directly to an 
insurance company." Id. 
Unlike the restitution order criticized in Stirba, and 
contrary to the State's contention on appeal, the trial court's 
order in this case mandated that Pomikala pay restitution to the 
Bank although it is not a direct victim of her crime. A.B. Point 
B. Hence, this case scenario is actually identical to that in 
Westerman to the extent that it involves an order of restitution 
payable to a party that bears only a contractual relationship to 
the actual victim. Id.; Westerman, 945 P.2d at 698-99. 
Accordingly, as in Westerman, the trial court erred as a matter of 
law in ordering Pomikala to pay restitution to the Bank where 
Pomikala did not "personally" perpetrate a crime against the Bank. 
Westerman, 945 P.2 at 698-99; Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(9) (a) (for 
purposes of restitution, Utah Code Ann. 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) , a 
" [v]ictim of crime' means any natural person against the charged 
crime . . . is alleged to have been perpetrated . . . by the 
defendant . . . personally"). 
In light of the foregoing, the State's assertion that the Bank 
is a "direct" victim for purposes of restitution, and its 
incidental reliance on Stirba, is incorrect. Accordingly, the 
trial court erred as a matter of law in ordering Pomikala to pay 
restitution to the Bank where it was not a direct victim but rather 
bore only a contractual relation ship to the immediately aggrieved 
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party, her grandmother.2 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Pomikala respectfully requests this 
Court to reverse and vacate the restitution order to First Security 
Bank. 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Pomikala requests oral argument and a published decision which 
clarifies that the Bank is not a "natural person" or a "direct" 
victim for purposes of Utah's restitution statute in effect at the 
time of Pomikala's hearing. 
SUBMITTED this JttJtL day of March, 1999. 
CATHERINE L. BEGIC ^ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, CATHERINE L. BEGIC, hereby certify that I have caused to 
be delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 450 South State Street, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 84114-023 0, and four copies to the Utah Attorney 
General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 
2
 The State concedes that the trial court "erred in 
applying Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998) to 
defendant's case" since the 1998 amended version of the statute 
was not in effect until "almost two months" after Pomikala's 
hearing. 
Pomikala submits on her opening brief in response to any 
other argument made by the State not directly addressed in her 
reply brief. 
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Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, 
this JiCiL day of March, 1999. 
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